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THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF T H E SOCIAL CONTRACT IN THE 
UNITED S T A T E S WORKPLACE AND T H E EMERGENCE OF NEW 
STRATEGIES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
David B. Lipsky and Ronald L. Seeber 
Cornell University, New York 
In recent years, a significant amount of public and 
academic attention has been devoted to the unravelling of 
the so-called 'New Deal' social contract and the emergence 
of a new social contract between workers and employers 
in the United States of America (US). In our paper, we 
will identify the forces of change that undermined the 
New Deal social contract during the post-World War II 
era and led to the reformulation of the workplace social 
contract in the US. It is our thesis that the transformation 
of the workplace social contract in the US significantly 
affected the resolution of employment disputes, giving 
rise to alternative dispute resolution (ADR) and other new 
approaches to conflict management. After briefly describing 
the origins of the New Deal social contract, we will assess 
the alignment of forces that resulted in the reformulation 
of the social contract in the 1990s. This new social contract 
has had historic consequences for most dimensions of the 
employment relationship, including job security, methods 
of pay, unionisation, and supervision, but its effects on 
workplace dispute resolution are especially noteworthy. 
Introduction: Transformation of the Social Contract in the United 
States 
In recent years, a significant amount of public and academic attention 
has been devoted to the unravelling of the so-called 'New Deal' social 
contract and the emergence of a new social contract between workers 
and employers in the United States of America (US). In this paper we 
will identify the forces of change that undermined the New Deal social 
contract during the post-World War II era and led to the reformulation 
of the workplace social contract in the US. It is our thesis that the 
transformation of the workplace social contract - what might be 
termed the social 'subcontract' - significantly affected the resolution 
of employment disputes, giving rise to alternative dispute resolution 
87 
88 David B. Lipsky and Ronald L. Seeber 
(ADR) and other new approaches to conflict management. After briefly 
describing the evolution of social contract theory, the traditional 
workplace subcontract of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, 
a n d t h e characteristics of t h e N e w Deal social contract, we will a s s e s s 
the alignment of forces that resulted in the reformulation of the 
workplace social subcontract in the 1990s. This new social subcontract 
has had historic consequences for most dimensions of the employment 
relationship, including job security, methods of pay, unionisation, 
and supervision, but its effects on workplace dispute resolution are 
especially noteworthy. 
The term 'social contract' has been defined as "the explicit and 
implicit agreements among the members of a political community 
that define the rights and responsibilities of people vis-a-vis their 
government" (Penner, Sawhill, and Taylor 2000: 16-17). The concept 
of a social contract has been applied to, employment relations, 
narrowing the focus of the contract to the rights and responsibilities 
of employees vis-a-vis their employer (Business Week, March 11, 1996; 
Rifkin 1995; Donaldson and Dunfee 1999). In the US, scholars and 
commentators of every political stripe have called for a new workplace 
social subcontract. On the left, for example, Jeremy Rifkin (1995), in 
The End of Work, predicts that technological change (especially in the 
realm of biotechnology) and 'hypercapitalism' will necessitate a new 
social contract that incorporates a radical reordering of workplace 
relationships. Paradoxically, perhaps the concept has been no less 
popular among many business executives. In a cover story, 'Writing 
a New Social Contract', Business Week discussed the longstanding 
division within the business community on the question of corporate 
social responsibility. On the one hand, according to the article, there 
were 'liberals' who believed in a 'stakeholder economy' that balanced 
the interests of managers, employees, customers, and communities. 
On the other hand, there were conservatives who maintained 'a 
faith in the restorative powers of the marketplace' and denied that 
corporations had the obligation to be socially responsible. Business 
Week described how certain elements of the business community were 
attempting to define a new position regarding the social responsibility 
of corporations: 
In isolated pockets of Corporate America, a middle path is slowly 
emerging, one that reflects a new paradigm for business and society 
in a global market. It recognises that job security died with the 1980s-
but concedes, too, that employers bear an obligation to help workers 
through transitions, and it attempts to align the interests of investors, 
managers, and employees, aiming to share both the risks and rewards 
of doing business (Business Week, March 11, 1996). 
This paper is based on research the authors have been conducting 
for nearly seven years on the use of ADR and conflict management 
systems in American corporations. Our research has consisted of a 
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survey of t h e g e n e r a l counsel or chief litigators of t h e Fortune 1000 on 
topics related to ADR as well as field interviews and case studies we 
conducted (with considerable assistance from our colleagues) in more 
than fifty organisations across a broad spectrum of industries and 
sectors in the US (Lipsky, Seeber and Fincher 2003). 
The Evolution of Social Contract Theory 
The theory of the social contract has its origins in the work of 
seventeenth and eighteenth century philosophers, most notably 
Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The 
Protestant Reformation and the decline in the authority of the Catholic 
Church had served to weaken the divine authority of the monarchic 
form of government. Europe had been ravaged by the wars of the 
Reformation, and philosophers recognised that the authority of the 
King, and more generally civil government, needed a new justification. 
"In their search, political theorists - and especially the Protestants 
among them - turned to the old biblical concept of a covenant or 
contract, such as the one between God and Abraham and the Israelites 
of the Old Testament" (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2002). 
In classical philosophy a social contract can be embodied in an 
actual document (such as the Magna Carta or a constitution), but 
is more likely to be implicit or hypothetical. It is a compact between 
rulers and their people that defines their respective rights and duties. 
What distinguished the theories of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau was 
their attempt "to justify political authority on grounds of individual 
self interest and rational consent", rather than on divine authority. 
These theories "attempted to demonstrate the value and purposes of 
organised government by comparing the advantages of civil society 
with the disadvantages of the state of n a t u r e , a hypothetical condition 
characterised by a complete absence of governmental authority" 
(Encyclopaedia Britannica 2002; Hobbes 1651; Locke 1690; Rousseau 
1762). By the nineteenth century, social contract theory had fallen 
out of favour. Other schools of philosophy (such as Kantian idealism, 
logical positivism, and Marxism) gained dominance. But in the 
twentieth century, social contract theory made a comeback, primarily 
because of the work of John Rawls. In common with his intellectual 
predecessors, Rawls attempted to justify governmental authority 
on the basis of ethical principles. In Rawls's view, a social contract 
codifies the legitimate and reasonable obligations of all citizens in a 
civil society. Rawls, in contrast to Hobbes, does not view social contract 
theory as an explanation for the origins of civil government, but rather 
as a means of analysing the legitimacy of political obligations (Rawls 
1999; for a contrary view, see Nozick 1974). 
The trail that connects the classical concept of the social contract 
with the contemporary and popular use of the term is a long and 
winding one. It is a 'stretch' to use the same term that was first meant 
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to describe efforts to justify the sovereign authority of government to 
justify, in current usage, the special interests of various stakeholder 
groups. What are the implications of these alternative concepts of 
the social contract for conflict resolution? In classical theory, a social 
contract w a s in t h e first i n s t a n c e a m e a n s of p r e v e n t i n g conflicts from 
arising. Under a social contract, individuals exchanged their unlimited 
liberty for the safety and security provided by sovereign power. If 
conflicts arose, they would be resolved by the sovereign (Hobbes 
1651). 
The classical view of the social contract, in sum, justified the need 
for citizens to obey the law of the sovereign. Conflict, therefore, could not 
be tolerated if it was directed against the sovereign, who represented 
the will of the people. Some scholars see in Rousseau's emphasis on an 
all-powerful sovereign t h e roots of t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m . Locke, on t h e other 
hand, maintained that if the laws of the state conflicted with natural 
law, natural law had to prevail. In the US, Locke's view provided a 
rationale for the supremacy of the judicial branch of government. The 
power of the judiciary to overturn acts of the legislature is based on the 
view that a statute should not be allowed to violate the natural rights 
of citizens (Rousseau 1762; Locke 1690). 
The Workplace as a Social 'Subcontract' 
The social contract that governed the workplace-what might be termed 
the social subcontract-from the middle of the nineteenth century 
t h r o u g h t h e first four decades of t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y w a s a compact 
fashioned out of the imperatives of industrialisation. Industrialisation 
strengthened the authority of management to make decisions regarding 
the products to be produced, the prices charged, the business location, 
the investments needed in new technologies, and the deployment 
and supervision of the work force. Almost all organisations had a 
hierarchical authority structure featuring top-down management. At 
the workplace, managers and supervisors had the authority to direct 
employees. In the absence of trade unions, that authority could not be 
questioned unless management violated the law. 
Under the hierarchical authority structure that prevailed in US 
enterprise through the last half of the nineteenth century and the first 
part of the twentieth century, conflict was considered dysfunctional. 
Managers never thought of conflict strategically; if they considered 
it at all, it was usually a phenomenon they did their best to avoid, 
suppress, or ignore. If, despite their best efforts, they were forced 
to deal with conflicts with their employees, the remedy was to 
punish those responsible. There was little tolerance for dissent at 
the workplace. Certainly before the passage of the National Labor 
Relations Act in 1935 (known as the 'Wagner Act'), it was common for 
managers to deal with union-organising drives by firing the employees 
who led them. The paper now turns to the shift from this traditional 
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workplace subcontract to the New Deal social contract that emerged 
in the 1940s and endured until the 1980s. Under the workplace 
subcontract governing employment relations, managers gained a 
relatively free hand in controlling production and the work force and 
employees gained access to good jobs at good wages. 
The R i s e of Unionism 
Beginning in the depths of the Depression, unionism swept through 
the ranks of blue-collar workers. When Franklin Roosevelt became 
President in 1933, the union representation rate was about 5 per 
cent. When Dwight Eisenhower became President in 1954, it was 
nearly 35 per cent. The dramatic surge of unionism in the 1930s was 
often accompanied by strikes and picketing. Occasionally, the tug of 
war between employers and unions became violent. In the realm of 
industrial relations, the social contract was severely tested by conflicts 
between unions and employers in the 1930s (Lipsky, Seeber, and 
Fincher 2003: 63). 
The turmoil and tumult of the 1930s motivated the US public and 
its elected representatives to search for policy measures that would 
foster fairness and equity in employment relations and remove the 
sources of disruption and violence. In industrial relations, President 
Roosevelt signed the Wagner Act into law in 1935. This law guaranteed 
the right of workers to organise and be represented by unions in 
collective bargaining, prohibited employers from discriminating 
against their employees on the basis of their union activity, and 
gave workers the right to vote in secret-ballot elections as a means 
of resolving union representation questions. The Wagner Act was 
significant on several dimensions. Not only did it deter violence 
in labour relations and encourage workers to join unions, it also 
represented a symbolic codification of the collective rights of workers in 
American jurisprudence. Under the Wagner Act collective rights took 
precedence over individual rights to an extent that would never again 
be matched. 
Product Market Competition 
By the end of World War II, the US was indisputably the leading 
economy in the world. It had about 5 per cent of the world's population 
but produced nearly one-third of the world's goods and services. 
The core of its economic strength (autos, steel, chemicals, electrical 
machinery, and mining) was protected by restrictions on international 
trade, including high tariff walls, which had been heightened by 
Depression-era legislation designed to safeguard jobs and profits. Only 
about 5 per cent of the goods and services consumed in the US were 
imported from abroad (Lipsky, Seeber, and Fincher 2003: 40). 
Throughout most of the twentieth century, product market 
competition in the US was limited by the existence of oligopolies. 
In 1960, for example, General Motors produced nearly half the cars 
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purchased in the United States; the number of cars imported from 
Europe amounted to a mere trickle and none were imported from 
Japan (MacDonald 1963: 4—14). The first imported Japanese cars, 
Datsuns, did not arrive in the United States until 1963 (Halberstam 
1986). In several major industries, government regulation seriously 
constrained, or in fact prevented, product market competition. 
Regulation limited competition in telephones, airlines, railroads, over-
the-highway trucking, intercity bus service, gas and electric utilities, 
and other industries (Cappelli 1987: 135-186). 
The protections and privileges enjoyed by many US corporations 
gave them considerable discretion, if not total control, over price and 
wage setting. In protected and regulated markets, wage increases 
could be passed on to customers through higher prices, and prices 
could be raided without fear of losing too many customers. Of course, 
not all industries were insulated from the forces of the marketplace. 
Companies in industries such as textiles and apparel, wholesale and 
retail trade, and auto supply and repair attempted to survive in a 'dog-
eat-dog' world. The garment-producing sweatshop, the 'mom-and-pop' 
grocery store, and the corner gasoline station were outside the scope of 
the New Deal social contract. 
The work force in the 1950s and 1960s was dominantly blue collar. 
At the turn of the twentieth century, about 38 per cent of the work force 
was employed in agriculture and about 31 per cent in goods-producing 
industries such as mining, manufacturing, and construction. But by 
1950, the proportion of the work force in agriculture had dropped to 
about 23 per cent, while the proportion in goods-producing industries 
remained about 31 per cent (US Department of Labor 2001: 3,122, and 
134). 
The Characteristics and Coverage of the 'New Deal' Social 
Contract 
By the end of World War II, both labour and management in the US 
were eager to rationalise and bring order to a chaotic workplace. Both 
sides were willing to develop processes and procedures that would 
serve to regulate employment relationships. The New Deal version of 
the social contract was the consequence of these shared objectives. At 
many worksites, a broad, if fragile, consensus developed that would last 
more than thirty years. Managers would recognise the legitimacy of 
unions, unions would restrict their concerns to well-defined workplace 
issues and government would be the impartial arbiter, helping to 
ensure a level playing field. The foundation had been laid for the 
unionised version of the social contract in employment relations. 
Conceptually, the New Deal social contract promised significant, 
tangible benefits to most (but not all) individuals, groups, and 
institutions in US society in exchange for their accepting certain 
responsibilities and obligations. The scope of the New Deal social 
contract was very broad — broader than the social contract had ever 
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been in the past - but clearly it did not include everyone. Its most novel 
feature was probably i t s (implicit) inclusion of t r a d e unions. 
For most workers, union and non-union alike, the New Deal 
social contract promised a comfortable middle-class standard of 
living - provided the worker was a law-abiding, English-speaking, 
heterosexual white male. After World War II, middle-class Americans 
were able to enjoy a level of material well-being t h a t was unparalleled 
in world history. The quid pro quo for the middle-class lifestyle, which 
became the norm for a majority of Americans in the post-World War 
II period, was a set of fairly rigid obligations and responsibilities, not 
only on the job but off as well. Under the New Deal social contract, 
standardisation of the terms and conditions of employment was the 
norm for middle-income wage earners and conformity to accepted 
standards was the expectation. 
The implicit terms of the New Deal social contract provided 
corporations with many benefits, including special tax advantages, 
subsidies, and an array of protections from the competitive pressures 
of the marketplace. In exchange, corporations were expected to 
provide the goods and services that would guarantee prosperity, 
avoid a resumption of the Depression, and (as symbolised by the Full 
Employment Act of 1946) maintain a tolerable rate of unemployment. 
In large part the corporate obligation centred on the provision of good 
jobs, adequate pay, and sufficient (but not perfect) job security. Until the 
1970s, however, the corporate obligation did not include the provision 
of safe jobs, a guarantee of pensions, or the requirement to provide 
equal opportunity for minorities and women. Nor did the New Deal 
social contract prevent corporations from polluting the environment. 
Under the New Deal social contract, unions enjoyed protections 
and privileges that had never previously existed and, to a degree, that 
may never again be duplicated. Indeed, with hindsight, the status of 
unions under the New Deal social contract increasingly appears to be 
an aberration in US history. Trade union influence expanded not only 
in the workplace but also in the political arena. After twenty years of 
jurisdictional rivalry and bitter feuding, the AFL and CIO merged in 
1955. /I 
The Unravelling of the Workplace Social 'Subcontract' in the United 
States 
By the 1980s, the glue that had held together the New Deal social 
contract had come unstuck. The forces bringing about transformation 
included the increasing globalisation of business, the growth of 
multinational corporations, and the rapid pace of technological change. 
These factors, in turn, required corporations operating in international 
m a r k e t s to accelerate t h e pace of t h e i r decision-making. No longer did 
managers have the luxury of tolerating any aspect of their business 
that dampened their ability to respond to market pressures. 
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The R i s e of the Knowledge-Based Economy 
The transformation of the social contract, particularly with regard 
to workplace institutions, really began in the 1980s. In the 1960s, 
US economic strength was still based on its ability to produce and 
distribute manufactured products, but by the 1980s its strength was 
based on its ability to produce and distribute information. The US had 
become a knowledge-based economy. This historic change necessitated 
a reworking of the social contract. 
By the 1980s, the ^industrialisation' of the United States was 
in full swing. In the economic battle against imported products from 
Germany, Japan, and elsewhere, US manufacturing was in full 
retreat. In autos, auto parts, steel, aluminium, apparel, and dozens of 
other industries plants were closed, jobs were permanently lost, and 
communities were abandoned. The industrial centres of the northeast 
and Midwest were left in shambles (Bluestone and Harrison 1982: 2 5 -
81). Computings and other high-tech industries were on a growth path, 
but no one could be certain in the 1980s that these industries would 
dominate world markets in the future. Indeed, many predicted that the 
Japanese would ultimately control the microchip and microprocessor 
markets, gaining success in those sectors as they already had in autos, 
steel, and electronic products. 
Ronald Reagan's election to the presidency in 1980 signalled a 
distinct rightward shift in the nation's political climate. The new 
conservative political climate of the nation, a reaction in part to 
the excesses of the 1960s, helped accelerate the move to deregulate 
US industry. Deregulation had begun in earnest during the Carter 
presidency, starting with the passage of the Airline Deregulation 
Act in 1978, which virtually eliminated federal controls of the airline 
industry (Cappelli 1987: 135-86). During the Reagan years, it spread 
rapidly to telephone, telecommunications, trucking, and other heavily 
regulated industries, supported by Democrats and Republicans alike. 
Thus, the combination of globalisation, heightened competition, 
deregulation, and technological change served to undermine the terms 
and conditions of the New Deal social contract. 
The Litigation Explosion 
The forces affecting the n a t u r e of the social contract included not only 
globalisation and technological change but also the so-called litigation 
explosion'. The number of employment lawsuits grew dramatically 
following the passage of the many new statutes affecting employment 
relations in the 1960s. More and more dimensions of t h e employment 
relationship were brought under the scrutiny of the court system and 
of a multitude of regulatory agencies. The delays and costs associated 
with disputes - and particularly with litigation - became a factor US 
business needed to manage and control. Olson (1991) sees that the 
'litigation explosion' t h a t began in the 1960s was behind t h e emergence 
of ADR in the United States. 
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Proponents of the view that there has been a litigation explosion 
cite the fact that since the 1960s litigation increased approximately 
seven times faster than the national population. The US has about 5 
per cent of the world's population but 70 per cent of the world's lawyers 
(Garry 1997: 15-16). A 1994 survey by Tillinghast-Towers Perrin 
estimated that tort liability cost the United States USD 152 billion per 
year (Gold 1997). Other data show that in the last two decades, the 
number of suits filed in federal courts concerning employment matters 
grew by 400 per cent (US Department of Labor 1994: 25-33). In the 
decade of the 1990s, the number of civil cases in US federal courts 
involving charges of discrimination alone nearly tripled. Plaintiffs who 
won their employment discrimination suits received a median award 
of USD200,000 in 1996; one in nine received an award of USD1 million 
or more (Litras 2000: 1-13). 
The purported increase in business and employment litigation has 
been accompanied by delays in the settlement of such cases. According 
to the Dunlop Commission (established by the Clinton administration 
in 1993), "[ojverburdened federal and state judicial dockets mean that 
years often pass before an aggrieved employee is able to present his 
or her claim in court" (US Department of Labor 1994: 50). In 1994, a 
panel of nine federal judges commissioned by the Judicial Conference 
of the United States noted that the huge increases in the caseload 
of the federal courts had further slowed the already languid rate of 
processing civil cases (US Department of Labor 1994: 50). In sum, 
the litigation explosion clogged the dockets of federal and state courts 
in the US, leading to longer delays and higher costs in the use of 
traditional means of dispute resolution. 
In our interviews with corporate managers and attorneys we 
found that almost all of our interviewees had the perception that their 
organisations are much more likely to be defendants in civil litigation 
of all types than they were a generation ago. That perception has 
translated into action for many businesses as they seek to gain more 
control over the litigation process and its results (Lipsky, $Seeber and 
Fincher 2003). 
Legal and Tort Reform 
Frustration with the growing burden of litigation led many in the 
business community, first, to oppose various federal measures to 
regulate the employment relationship and, second, to lobby for tort (or 
legal) reforms that would limit the ability of one party to sue another. 
The business community and its allies have often joined forces with the 
Republican Party to press for tort reform, although the issue has never 
been framed entirely along conventional political lines. The movement 
for tort reform reached a crest in 1994 with the election of a Republican 
majority in the 104th Congress. The Republican Party's 'Contract with 
America' contained a provision pledging party support for reform that 
would curtail the flood of "frivolous lawsuits and outlandish damage 
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rewards [that] make a mockery of our civil justice system" (Yilmaz 
1998: 1-34). However, Congressional Republicans failed to achieve 
comprehensive tort reform, although piecemeal measures were passed 
and signed into law by President Clinton. President Bush has made 
achieving federal tort reform a major legislative priority and Congress 
is once again actively considering the issue. It is our contention, based 
on our interviews in the field, t h a t the failure of tort reform is directly 
linked to the rise of alternative dispute resolution. 
The Professionalisation of Human Resource Management 
Another factor that has played a significant role in transforming the 
social contract in the US has been the professionalisation of human 
resource management. As late as the 1960s, the personnel manager 
was on the bottom of the management ladder. The status of the 
personnel function was elevated significantly in t h e ensuing decades, 
along the way changing its name from 'personnel' to 'human resource 
m a n a g e m e n t ' as a symbol of i t s higher s t a t u s . 
In the 'Information Age,' attracting, retaining, and motivating a 
skilled and diverse work force has become a strategic issue for the 
corporation. The human resource function has been professionalised 
because the failure of the organisation to attract and retain the types 
of workers it needs could very well threaten not only its profitability 
but also its survival. As the twentieth century came to an end, in many 
corporations the executive in charge of the human resource function 
had become top management's business partner (Schuler 1994: 58-
76). The professionalisation of human resource management has had 
significant effects on the social contract governing the workplace. 
The Decline of Unionism 
From its peak of 35 per cent of total payroll in 1954, union density has 
steadily declined for nearly fifty years. By 2001, unions represented 
only 13.6 per cent of the US work force. Although the proportion of 
unionised employees in the public sector had risen to 37.4 per cent, 
the proportion in the private sector had fallen to only 9 per cent (US 
Bureau of the Census 1970; US Department of Labor J a n u a r y 2001). 
Management opposition is clearly one important factor explaining 
this long-term decline, but there are others. Union membership had 
been concentrated i n t h e smokestack i n d u s t r i e s , precisely t h e i n d u s t r i e s 
hit hardest by international competition and deindustrialisation. 
In addition, unions, headed mostly by ageing white men, found it 
increasingly difficult to organise the growing number of women, 
immigrants, and minorities entering the labour force. The shift from 
a manufacturing to an information economy also brought about an 
increase in the white-collar, service, and professional segments of the 
work force, segments the union movement has had difficulty reaching. 
Still another factor was the weakness of US labour law. There 
was growing recognition by employers and unions alike that the 
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legal framework developed in the context of the Great Depression 
was steadily losing relevance in an increasingly information-based 
economy. 
Both labour and management became more and more dissatisfied 
with the law. Labour complained that the law deterred their efforts to 
organise the unorganised and lacked adequate sanctions to deal with 
employer violations. Management asserted that the rights granted to 
unions interfered with efficient production and feared that the law 
would obstruct the shift toward team-based work. Although both sides 
were unhappy with the law, they could not agree on how to change it. 
In the face of this impasse, Congress could not successfully pass any 
significant changes in the nation's basic labour law during the last four 
decades of the twentieth century. 
The Reorganisation of the Workplace 
All of the forces of change described in this paper - globalisation, 
rapid technological change, the growing legislative regulation of 
employment, the decline of unionism - were associated with a 
significant reorganisation of the way work is performed in many US 
companies. A hallmark of the reorganisation of the workplace is the 
decline in the importance of hierarchy and the rise of team-based work. 
Many US employers have discovered that employee performance and 
productivity can be enhanced if employees are empowered to assume 
more responsibility for the manner in which they perform their 
work. In many US workplaces, management has removed layers of 
supervision and delegated substantial authority to teams of employees 
to control the direction of their activities. Virtually every corporation 
we visited in the course of conducting our field research purported to 
use a team-based system of production. 
High-Performance Work Systems 
The ultimate form of team-based work is a so-called liigh-performance 
work system'. The elements of such a system always include both 
teams and delayering. In General Motors' Saturn plant in ^pringhill, 
Tennessee, for example, management and the union agreed to 
eliminate all first-line supervisors and, instead, have teams elect 
their leaders (Rubinstein and Kochan 2001). Another element of a 
high-performance work system is the elimination of job classifications, 
reversing Taylorsim that had run rampant. Newer plants opened in 
the 1980s or later frequently had many fewer job classifications than 
older plants operating in a more traditional fashion (Verma 1983) 
as US companies realised that improved efficiency and performance 
could be achieved by recombining jobs and eliminating multiple job 
classifications. Instead of having workers perform a fixed set of tasks 
in a narrowly defined job, employers adopted the practice of having 
employees rotate across the jobs performed by the members of a team. 
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Job rotation gives rise to the concepts of 'multi-skilling' and 'multi-
tasking'. It requires employers to have a commitment to training and 
retraining of the workforce on an ongoing basis. 
Another feature of a high-performance work system is a contingent 
and flexible compensation scheme. In fact, as the twentieth century 
came to an end, many employers - even those not relying on team-
based production - had abandoned their conventional pay practices 
and adopted more flexible compensation plans. A growing number of 
employers no longer increased their employees' base pay annually 
but instead made improvement in pay contingent on either employee 
performance and productivity or the profitability of the firm. In many 
organisations, performance-based pay, profit sharing, lump-sum 
bonuses, £md other contingent pay schemes replaced automatic annual 
pay adjustments (Kochan, Katz and McKersie 1986). 
In the last quarter of the twentieth century many employers came 
to believe there was a direct link between their employees' participation 
in workplace decision-making, and their companies' ability to compete 
in world markets. Employee participation went hand in hand with 
team-based production. Companies, often working cooperatively with 
their unions, experimented with a variety of workplace innovations 
designed to foster employee involvement in decision-making. As 
Kochan, Katz, and McKersie observed, these innovations had two basic 
objectives: one was to "increase the participation and involvement of 
individuals in informal work groups so as to overcome adversarial 
relations and increase employee motivation, commitment, and 
problem-solving potential"; a second was to "alter the organisation of 
work so as to simplify work rules, lower costs, and increase flexibility 
in the management of human resources" (Kochan, Katz, and McKersie, 
1986: 147). 
Teams, delayering, multi-skilling, multi-tasking, contingent pay, 
empowerment, and participation are all elements of a full-fledged, 
high-performance work system. Not all US employers embraced all of 
these elements, but a majority adopted one or more of them (Osterman 
1994: 173-88; Osterman 2000: 179-96). The reorganisation of the 
workplace was a consequence of management's drive for increased 
flexibility in employment relations. To become and remain competitive, 
US employers realised they needed greater flexibility in the workplace. 
Flexibility would allow them to shed outdated work rules and practices, 
motivate employees, and enhance employee productivity. 
The reorganisation of the workplace has also had pronounced 
implications for conflict management in that a workplace conflict 
management system is the logical handmaiden of a high-performance 
work system. In our survey of the Fortune 1000 and our fieldwork, 
we discovered that a company that had adopted advanced workplace 
practices was more likely to have a conflict management system. 
The correlation between the use of a conflict management system 
and the use of advanced human resource practices is not a perfect 
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one. Nevertheless, a growing number of managers have come to 
realise that delegating responsibility for controlling work to teams 
is consistent with delegating authority for preventing or resolving 
conflict to the members of those teams. Through most of the twentieth 
century, management had the authority, as we noted earlier, to direct 
employees in all aspects of their working life and to resolve conflicts 
arising in the workplace. As we also noted, even the rise of unionism 
did not fundamentally alter management's decision-making authority. 
But the ineluctable forces that have transformed US society are 
producing a new social contract at the workplace - a social contract 
that requires new strategies of managing workplace conflict (Lipsky, 
Seeber and Fincher, 2003). 
Implications for Workplace Dispute Resolution 
For nearly three decades, a 'quiet revolution' has been occurring in the 
US system of justice: a dramatic growth in the use of ADR (such as 
arbitration, mediation, fact-finding, facilitation, and so forth) to resolve 
disputes that might otherwise have to be handled through litigation. 
The growth in its use in recent years clearly seems associated with the 
unravelling of the New Deal social contract and the emergence of a 
new workplace compact. 
The Growth of ADR in the United States 
Many people are unaware of how widespread the use of ADR is in the 
US. As a consequence of its use, a significant shift in the resolution of 
many types of disputes from the court system to private forums has 
taken place. Some observers have claimed that this shift represents 
the de facto privatisation of the American system of justice. The 
declining trend in the use of trials in the United States to resolve 
disputes is an indicator of privatisation. Samborn reports a significant 
drop in federal trials over the last thirty years. In 1970, of the 127,280 
civil and criminal cases filed in the federal courts, 10 per cent were 
resolved after either a jury or a bench trial; in 2001, of the 313,615 
cases filed, only 2.2 per cent were resolved by either a jury or a bench 
trial. Evidence suggests similar trends in state courts. As Samborn 
notes, the growth of private dispute resolution is the principal cause 
of t h e declining u s e of t r i a l s , b u t i t s u s e "makes some j u r i s t s uneasy". 
Concerned jurists believe private dispute resolution "shields lawsuits 
from the imposition of public values about important concerns, such 
as discrimination in the workplace, price fixing or unsafe products" 
(Samborn 2002: 26-7). On the other hand, most jurists acknowledge 
that private dispute resolution reduces costs, minimises the use of 
scarce judicial resources, and produces reasonable results for the 
parties (Samborn 2002: 27). 
The research we have conducted over the last seven years strongly 
suggests that ADR is now firmly institutionalised in a majority of 
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US corporations, at least for employment and commercial disputes. 
We believe the United States passed the 'tipping point' in the use 
of ADR at some point in the last decade. In our field research we 
discovered the fact that few, if any, organisations that adopt the use 
of ADR ever go back to older methods of resolving disputes. Indeed, 
our research revealed that when organisations begin to use ADR, 
rather than going back they tend to go forward. They move beyond 
the procedures and techniques of ADR and toward the use of a system, 
at least in the workplace. They begin their journey by attempting to 
manage litigation; they then expand their concern to the management 
of disputes; and ultimately they reach the point of systematically 
managing conflict (Lipsky, Seeber and Fincher 2003). 
Dispute Management versus Conflict Management 
It is our belief t h a t conflict m a n a g e m e n t is m u c h more comprehensive 
than dispute management. At the root of this conclusion is the 
distinction between conflicts and disputes. Conflicts can be seen 
as nearly any organisational friction that produces a mismatch in 
expectations of the proper course of action for an employee or a group 
of employees. Conflicts do not always lead to disputes - sometimes 
they are ignored, sometimes suppressed, and sometimes deemed 
unimportant enough to be left alone. Disputes, on the other hand, are 
a subset of the conflicts t h a t require resolution, activated by the filing 
of a grievance, a lawsuit against an organisation, or even a simple 
written complaint. 
Accepting this distinction between conflicts and disputes allows the 
argument naturally to progress to a distinction between attempts to 
manage them. The management of disputes, which after all represent 
only the tip of the iceberg of conflict, is a significantly less complex 
problem. To manage disputes successfully, the organisation need only 
manoeuvre the dispute into a forum most to its advantage to attain 
lower costs (transactional and outcome), a quicker speed of resolution, 
or simply a higher probability of a better outcome. Such activities can 
constitute the effective management of disputes. Thus, much of what 
we see of dispute management looks like 'forum shopping'. 
Conflict Management Systems 
Organisations that desire to manage conflict must go well beyond this 
smaller set of processes and into more facets of organisational life, 
encompassing a much wider range of questions, the involvement of 
more p a r t s of t h e organisation, a n d a more complex system. The goals 
of a conflict management system are broader and more numerous. 
Conflict management systems attempt to channel conflict in productive 
directions, for example, not just to manage their resolution. Conflict 
management systems spread the responsibility for conflict and its 
resolution to the lowest levels of the organisation. Thus they require 
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training to be widespread. They seek to transform the organisation, 
not j u s t a set of processes. This distinction among dispute and conflict 
management systems, and litigation, is graphically depicted in Figure 
1. These three types of conflict management differ in terms of the depth 
of their involvement in the organisation, the people responsible for the 
m a n a g e m e n t of t h e system, and t h e functions involved in t h e creation 
and maintenance of the system. Dispute management is always more 
complex than litigation management, and conflict management more 
complicated than both. 
Figure 1 
The Conflict Pyramid 
WHO HOW 
is responsible? is it done? 
There is no general agreement on the precise definition of a conflict 
management system, even among experts (£ostantino and Merchant 
1996; Ury, Brett and Goldberg 1993; Slaikeu and Hasson 1996). Clearly, 
though, an authentic system is not merely a practice, a procedure, or a 
policy. It is something more encompassing, which may incorporate all 
three: practice, procedure, and policy. Our understanding of systems 
more generally is rooted in the classic works on the system concept 
(Von Bertalanffy 1951:302-61; Boulding 1956:197-208). Of the several 
attempts that have been made to extend the systems concept to conflict 
management, we prefer the definition contained in a report prepared 
for the Society for Professionals in Dispute Resolution (SPIDR).1 
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The report says that an integrated conflict management system has 
five characteristics. We summarise these characteristics in Exhibit 1. 
Exhibit 1 
The Five Characteristics of an 
Integrated Conflict Management System 
Scope: A system sfiould have the broadest feasible scope, providing 
options for all people in the workplace, including employees, 
supervisors, professionals, and managers to have all types of 
problems considered. 
Culture: A system should 'welcome dissent' (or tolerate 
disagreement) and encourage resolution of conflict at the lowest 
possible level through direct negotiation. 
Multiple Access Points: U s e r s of a system should be able to identify, 
and have access to, the person, department, or entity most capable 
(in terms of authority, knowledge, and experience) of advising the 
individual about the conflict management system and managing 
the problem in question. 
Multiple Options: A system should allow users the choice of more 
than one option for resolving a problem or dispute; more specifically, 
a system should contain both rights-based and interest-based 
options for addressing conflict. 
Support Structures: A system requires support structures that are 
capable of coordinating and managing the multiple access points 
and multiple options; the structure should integrate effective 
conflict management into the organisation's daily operations. 
Designers of systems need to pay particular attention to questions of 
fairness. The Association for Conflict Resolution (ACR) committee, 
after considerable debate, reached agreement on eight essential 
elements of a fair conflict management system: 
1. to the extent possible, participation in a system should be 
voluntary; 
2. t h e privacy and confidentiality of t h e processes should be protected 
to the fullest extent allowed by law; 
3. 'neutrals' (mediators, arbitrators, ombudspersons, and so forth) 
should be truly neutral and impartial; 
4. 'neutrals' should be adequately trained and qualified; 
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5. the legitimacy of a system will be enhanced to the extent that it 
is "characterised by diversity in [its] core of neutrals, including 
mediators and arbitrators"; 
6. a system should have policies that specifically prohibit any form of 
reprisal or retaliation; 
7. a system must be consistent with an organisation's existing 
contracts, including collective bargaining agreements; and 
8. a system must not undermine the statutory or constitutional rights 
of the disputants. 
Our own research has shown that some organisations claiming to have 
conflict management systems could not meet all the criteria prescribed 
by the ACR committee. In fact, in contemporary US organisations 
today, a system as prescribed by ACR is more the ideal than the reality. 
Our studies of organisations that we believe have systems, even though 
they may fall short of the ideal recommended by ACR, reveal several 
other characteristics these organisations share: 
1. Proactive. The organisation's approach to conflict management is 
proactive rather than reactive: that is, the organisation has moved 
from waiting for disputes to occur to preventing (if possible) or 
anticipating them before they arise. 
2. Shared responsibility. The responsibility for conflict (or litigation) 
management is not confined to the counsel's office or to an outside 
law firm, b u t is shared by all levels of m a n a g e m e n t . 
3. Delegation of authority. The authority for preventing and resolving 
conflict is, therefore, delegated to the lowest feasible level of the 
organisation. 
4. Accountability. Managers are held accountable for the successful 
prevention or resolution of conflict; the reward and performance 
review systems in the organisation reflect this managerial duty. 
5. Ongoing training. Education and training in relevant conflict 
management skills are an ongoing activity of the organisation. 
6. Feedback loop. Managers use the experience they have gained 
in preventing or resolving conflict to improve the policies and 
performance of the organisation. 
Systems also vary in the procedures they employ for conflict resolution. 
We have investigated systems that include ombudspersons, peer-
review panels, facilitated discussions, mediation, arbitration, and 
multiple variations on these basic procedures. The choice of procedures 
can reflect the values underlying the system itself. Some conflict 
management systems place value on participation in the conflict 
resolution process, some on resolving disputes as quickly as possible, 
some simply value bringing conflict to the surface. The solutions 
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created to reach these fundamental goals will be reflected in the 
procedures used within the system. 
We believe it is also important to identify and analyse the 
participants in the conflict management system. One simple distinction 
is the amount the system relies on outsiders - n e u t r a l s and consultants, 
for example - to feed and maintain it. But it is important to go beyond 
the use of outsiders and into the organisation itself. The extent to 
which line managers are involved and responsible for resolving conflict 
is an important distinction between systems. Finally, it is important 
to analyse what is judged by an organisation to be critically important 
by looking at the features of the system they choose to measure and 
evaluate. Therefore, evaluation is another important feature of a well-
functioning system. 
Conclusions: A New Equilibrium? 
In this paper we have traced the evolution of the social contract and 
its implication for workplace dispute resolution. Table 1 provides a 
summary of the various conceptions of the social contract discussed 
in this paper and the implications of these conceptions for workplace 
dispute resolution. 
The classical conception of the social contract served to justify the 
authority of the sovereign, or more generally the state, to control and 
resolve conflict. In classical theory the use of private forums to resolve 
public claims was scarcely imagined. It was the rise of capitalism and 
democracy that eventually gave new meaning to the concept of a social 
contract. First in Europe and later in the newly formed US, the growth 
of private enterprise and reliance on free markets resulted in private 
parties assuming more responsibility for the resolution of conflict. 
Governments recognised the sanctity of private contracts, and private 
parties could negotiate those contracts with little interference from the 
state. Disputes arising under such contracts could be resolved in the 
courts, but in the United States and most western countries the use of 
private negotiation, mediation, and commercial arbitration to resolve 
such disputes came to be recognised as legitimate forms of conflict 
resolution. 
In US employment relations, the integrity of private employment 
contracts was highly respected under the traditional social contract. 
However, the imbalance of power between employers and employees 
meant that, in most instances, employers could effectively dictate 
the terms and conditions under which employees worked. Moreover, 
employers had the authority unilaterally to change the terms and 
conditions of employment. They could, for example, terminate 
employees at will. The employment-at-will doctrine, borrowed from 
British common law, allowed US employers to discharge employees for 
virtually any reason whatsoever. The implicit social contract governing 
the workplace did not recognise the legitimacy of worker participation 
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Table 1 
Conceptions of the Social Contract and Their Implications 
for Workplace Dispute Resolution 
Social 
Contract 
Era 
Forces of 
Change 
Breadth 
of 
Coverage 
Purposes 
and 
Object-
ives 
Effect on 
the Work-
place 
Dispos-
ition 
Toward 
Conflict 
and 
Dissent 
Effect on 
Work-
place 
Dispute 
Resol-
ution 
Classical 
17th and 18lh 
Century 
Decline of 
authority of 
the Church 
and Monarch 
Very narrow: 
rulers and 
property-
holding 
subjects 
Justify 
authority of 
the Sovereign 
and civil 
government 
Supports 
authority 
of employer 
and 'master-
servant 
doctrine' 
Conflict 
prevented or 
stringently 
controlled; 
dissent 
limited or 
suppressed 
Reinforces 
authority of 
the Sovereign, 
courts, and 
employers 
over 
workplace 
disputes 
Traditional 
19th and early 
20th Century 
Industrialis-
ation and 
the rise of 
the market 
economy 
Narrow: 
Owners 
of capital, 
managers and 
the state 
Justify 
capitalism, 
free markets, 
and authority 
of owners and 
managers 
Supports 
hierarchical 
structure of 
workplace and 
management's 
authority and 
prerogatives 
Conflict 
considered 
dysfunctional; 
some tolerance 
of dissent; 
strikes 
generally 
unlawful 
Heavy reliance 
on authority 
of employers 
and courts 
to control 
and resolve 
workplace 
disputes 
New Deal 
1930s to 1980s 
Great Depression, 
challenge of 
communism, 
strikes and 
violence in labor 
disputes 
Broad: Owners, 
managers, many 
workers (but not 
all), and the state 
Justify capitalism 
and continuing 
authority of 
owners and 
managers 
but recognise 
legitimacy of 
unions 
Supports 
management's 
authority and 
prerogatives 
except where 
modified by 
collective 
bargaining 
contracts 
Recognition of 
some positive 
aspects of conflict; 
strikes lawful but 
regulated 
Recognition 
of union and 
employee role in 
workplace dispute 
resolution; fosters 
use of mediation 
and arbitration, 
especially 
in union-
management 
disputes 
Emerging 
1990s and beyond 
Globalisation, 
technological 
change, decline of 
unionism, and rise of 
information economy 
Very broad: All 
stakeholders and 
most segments of 
society 
Justify global 
capitalism, free 
markets and 
competition; achieve 
balance between 
management 
authority and 
stakeholder rights 
Hierarchy replaced 
by team-based 
work; professional-
isation of human 
resource function; 
growing use of high-
performance work 
systems; employee 
participation in 
decision-making 
Conflict legitimate, 
but needs to be 
managed; dissent 
tolerated and even 
encouraged; strikes 
lawful but less 
effective 
Institutionalisation of 
ADR and emergence 
of workplace conflict 
management systems 
V 
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in any aspect of decision-making at the workplace, unless employers on 
their own volition invited employees to play such a role. Throughout 
the nineteenth and early twentieth century, neither federal nor state 
courts in the US were inclined to side with employees in disputes 
they might have with their employers. The courts enforced the 
employment-at-will doctrine and respected management's authority 
in the workplace. 
The rise of unionism modified the traditional social contract, at 
least for those employees who successfully formed unions. The New 
Deal social contract, t h e consequence of both t h e rise of unionism and 
the passage of legislation during the Roosevelt era, provided employees 
with protections and privileges they had never before enjoyed. The 
growth of collective bargaining changed the handling of workplace 
disputes. It made the use of mediation in new contract disputes and 
arbitration in grievance disputes the standard practice in many 
industries. The use of these dispute resolution techniques, in turn, 
fostered the development of a skilled cadre of professional arbitrators 
and mediators. The successful use of arbitration and mediation to 
resolve labor disputes proved to be a benchmark for those who later 
championed the use of alternative dispute resolution. Although 
collective bargaining amended the traditional social contract and led 
to the introduction of new methods of dispute resolution, the New Deal 
social contract did not diminish management's ultimate authority in 
the workplace. 
In this paper we have described the forces of change that have 
brought about the transformation of the workplace social contract. 
Globalisation, competition, technological change, the growing 
regulation of employment, and the litigation explosion, are some of the 
critical environmental factors that have brought about a new social 
contract at the workplace. The rise of human resource management, 
the decline of unionism, and the reorganisation of the workplace 
are some of the critical organisational factors associated with the 
new social contract. All of these forces, we maintain, have caused 
a transformation in workplace dispute resolution in the US. Under 
the traditional social contract, management's authority to manage 
and control conflict was largely unquestioned. Under the New Deal 
social contract, unions were given the right, under certain conditions, 
to challenge management's authority. Under the still-emerging new 
social contract, entirely new strategies and techniques are being used 
to manage and resolve conflict. 
An intriguing question is whether the emerging social contract 
in the US will constitute a new and stable equilibrium, matching in 
endurance the traditional and New Deal versions of the social contract, 
or whether it represents merely a transitional phase to other societal 
arrangements that can scarcely be imagined. Are the reorganisation 
of the workplace and the emergence of conflict management systems 
more or less permanent phenomena, or are they simply passing fads? 
T h e Social Contract and Dispute Resolution 1 0 7 
Put in broadest terms, has the United States - as Francis Fukuyama 
(1992) might argue - reached 'the end of history' or can it expect 
further evolution in both the general social contract and the workplace 
social subcontract? Recall that Fukuyama argued more than a decade 
ago that the modernisation process ultimately led to liberal democracy 
and market-oriented economies, dominating national and cultural 
forces. In his view, "the process of modernisation was a universal one 
that would sooner or later drag all societies in its train" toward the 
western model (Fukuyama, 2002). September 11, 2001 caused even 
Fukuyama to question whether the world was heading toward the 
universal acceptance of w e s t e r n v a l u e s . If t h e p a s t is a n y guide to t h e 
future, it seems to suggest to us that the new social contract is not the 
end of history, although it may be a significant stage in our evolution. 
But does the future lead to new societal arrangements we have not yet 
experienced or back to the resurrection of old arrangements we seem 
to have abandoned? 
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Notes 
1 Designing Integrated Conflict Management Systems: Guidelines for 
Practitioners and Decision Makers in Organisations (see Gosline et al., 
2001). It should be noted that in 2001 SPIDR, the Academy of Family 
Mediators, and CRENet (Conflict Resolution Education Network) merged 
to become the Association for Conflict Resolution (ACR). 
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